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KIMEL AND BEYOND: FIFTH CIRCUIT
TACKLES SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT IN
KAZMIER v. WIDMANN
Katherine K. Seegers*
EMINOLE Tribe of Fla. v. Florida marked the advent of a new
wave of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.' Overruling Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co.,2 the Supreme Court held that the Elev-
enth Amendment estops Congress from using its Article I power to
authorize suits by private individuals against non-consenting states.3 The
Court noted, however, that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
affirmatively grants Congress the authority to enforce Equal Protection
guarantees by abrogating the states' sovereign immunity.4 Thus Section
Five "curtails the vigor of the Eleventh Amendment."5 Following Semi-
nole Tribe came a significant line of sovereign immunity decisions, the
most recent being Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents.6 The first extensive appli-
cation of Kimel in the Fifth Circuit emerged from Kazmier v. Widmann.7
Kazmier denied enforcement of certain subsections of the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 8 against Louisiana in federal court because
Congress did not validly lift the states' immunity with respect to those
subsections.9 The Fifth Circuit's holding is a logical and correct applica-
tion of Kimel. Kazmier's requirement of congressional findings sufficient
to show a pattern of state-inflicted unconstitutional discrimination mir-
rors the Supreme Court's analysis in Kimel. Kimel held that, in the ab-
sence of such findings, the enactment of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) was disproportionate to a supposed remedial
object. Therefore, Congress did not validly exercise its Section Five
* B.A., 1999, Louisiana State University; Candidate for J.D., 2002, Southern Meth-
odist University School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Lackland Bloom
for his assistance with this casenote.
1. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
3. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
4. See id. at 59.
5. Michael Peter Hatzimichalis, Comment, Sovereignty, Federalism, and Property in
the Balance: A Paradox in the Making, 8 J.L. & PoL'Y 707, 744 (2000).
6. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
7. Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000).
8. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
9. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 532.
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power and did not validly abrogate immunity. 10 As such, the Kazmier
dissent incorrectly asserts that the majority misunderstood Kimel as re-
stricting Congress's Section Five power."
Janice Kazmier worked for Louisiana Department of Social Services
(LDSS). x2 Beginning in May of 1995, she had a series of absences. Spe-
cifically, she took one month of leave after breaking her arm. Addition-
ally, she was absent for at least one week in October of the same year to
care for her ill father. Finally, after breaking her wrist later in October,
she failed to return to work for the remainder of the calendar year. These
absences culminated in her termination on January 4, 1996.13
Following her termination, Kazmier filed suit against LDSS in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. She
alleged that LDSS violated several provisions of the FMLA when it fired
her for excessive absences. LDSS moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing
that the Eleventh Amendment afforded Louisiana sovereign immunity
and barred Kazmier from asserting her claim in federal court.' 4
Joining the lawsuit on Kazmier's behalf, the United States posited that
Congress validly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under the rele-
vant subsections of the FMLA; therefore, Kazmier could bring her claim
against Louisiana.' 5 The district court denied LDSS's motion to dismiss
the lawsuit, and LDSS appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.16 The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case,
instructing the district court to dismiss all claims against LDSS for want
of jurisdiction. 17
Since Seminole Tribe, abrogation of states' immunity has arisen in a
variety of contexts and has become a major issue in employment litiga-
tion arising under federal statutes.' 8 To abrogate states' sovereign immu-
10. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 87-92.
11. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 535.





17. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 533.
18. See generally Ill. State Univ. v. Varner,__ U.S. _, 120 S. Ct. 928 (2000) (granting
certiorari on issue of abrogation of states' immunity from EPA claims); Univ. of Ala. at
Birmingham Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, - U.S. -, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000) (granting certiorari
on issue of whether Congress validly abrogated states' immunity from ADA claims); Lavia
v. Pennsylvania, No. 99-3863, Dep't of Corr., 224 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding Congress
did not validly abrogate states' immunity from suit under the ADA); Kovacevich v. Kent
State Univ., 224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding the EPA constituted a proper abrogation
of immunity); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding Con-
gress did not validly abrogate states' immunity from ADA claims); Holman v. Indiana, 211
F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding the Eleventh Amendment did not bar employee's Title
VII claims); Varner v. I11. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding the EPA
was a valid exercise of congressional authority, making immunity unavailable as a defense);
Cooper v. St. Cloud State Univ., 226 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding the university was
immune from Title VII claim); Walker v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 213 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding the Eleventh Amendment barred employee's ADA claims against Missouri); Cis-
neros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding the ADA validly abrogated the
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nity validly, Congress must meet two requirements. First, it must
unequivocally express its intent to lift the immunity.19 Kazmier and
LDSS conceded this point.20 Second, Congress must act under a valid
exercise of power. 21 Stated broadly, the critical issue, then, was whether
Congress enacted subsections (C) and (D), found under entitlement to
leave,22 consistent with its power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.
Specifically, City of Boerne v. Flores requires that Congress meet the fol-
lowing test: the enactment of subsections (C) and (D) must be congruent
with and proportional to the injury that Congress sought to prevent or
remedy.23
To determine whether subsections (C) and (D) pass the congruence
and proportionality test, the court, in accordance with Kimel, first de-
cided what constitutional violations these subsections were designed to
prevent. Second, it decided whether the legislative record contained ac-
tual constitutional violations by the states sufficient to justify the enact-
ment of subsections (C) and (D). Interestingly, the court bifurcated its
analysis and conducted two distinct congruence and proportionality
tests-one for each subsection. Conceding that case law did not support
such a bifurcation, the court nevertheless reasoned that one subsection
might validly abrogate immunity, even if the other does not.24
Subsection (C) provides leave to an employee needing to care for a
spouse, child, or parent with a serious health condition. 25 Noting that
subsection (C) is prophylactic legislation, the court determined that Con-
gress's express intent in enacting it was to prevent employers from engag-
ing in sex-based discrimination when granting FMLA leave. 26 Congress
potentially has broad freedom to enact such legislation because sex dis-
crimination is subject to heightened scrutiny. 27 The problem, according
to the court, is that "[t]he mere invocation by Congress... of sex discrim-
states' immunity); Hundertmark v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2000)(holding application of EPA to states was within Congress's enforcement powers); Muller
v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding Congress validly abrogated states' immu-
nity in enacting the ADA); O'Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding
Congress properly abrogated states' immunity when it enacted the EPA); Dare v. Califor-
nia, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that Congress validly abrogated state's im-
munity from Title II ADA claims); Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 193
F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999) (determining that states do not have Eleventh Amendment im-
munity from ADA claims); In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against the State of
Ala., 198 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding Congress validly abrogated states' immu-
nity from Title VII disparate impact claims); Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.
1998) (determining Congress validly abrogated states' immunity from suit under the EPA
and concluding that the state was not protected from employee's title VII claims).
19. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
20. FMLA: Divided Fifth Circuit Finds No Abrogation of States' Sovereign Immunity
Under FMLA, 170 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-4 (Aug. 31, 2000).
21. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1)(C)-2612(a)(1)(D) (1994).
23. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
24. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (1994).




ination... is insufficient to support the validity of legislation under Sec-
tion 5."28 Prophylactic legislation must be proportional to "actual,
identified constitutional violations by the States."' 29 Since the court found
no such violations in the legislative record, it concluded that Congress did
not validly enact subsection (C) and prevented Kazmier from enforcing
the subsection. 30
Subsection (D) allows an employee to take leave because of her own
serious health condition. 31 The court rejected Kazmier's argument that
this subsection was enacted to prevent sex discrimination; instead, it de-
termined that Congress intended to combat two different types of dis-
crimination. First, it conceded that Congress was somewhat concerned
with pregnancy-based discrimination but noted that such discrimination
must not be equated with sex discrimination. 32 Furthermore, it stated
that Congress could not use its Section Five enforcement power to enact
legislation targeting pregnancy discrimination because such discrimina-
tion does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.33 Second, the court
determined that the more likely object of subsection (D) was to prevent
discrimination based on a temporary disability.34 The court speculated
that the FMLA prohibited significantly more state employment actions
than would probably be held unconstitutional under rational-basis re-
view-the applicable level of scrutiny for allegations of disability discrim-
ination.35  Thus, more likely than not, the subsection was
disproportionate to unconstitutional state conduct. More importantly,
however, the court found in the record no pattern of discrimination
against the temporarily disabled.36 Finally, the court urged that findings
of discrimination in the private sector could not be imputed to the public
sector.37
Judge Dennis authored a lengthy dissent throughout which he funda-
mentally disagreed with the majority's analysis. In particular, he asserted
that the majority misunderstood Kimel's congruence and proportionality
test as limiting Congress's enforcement power.38 Rather than employing
such a test, he explained, the only constitutional yardstick needed for an
Eleventh Amendment case is rational-basis scrutiny of the act in ques-
tion.39 In other words, were subsections (C) and (D) rational means to
an end comprehended by the Fourteenth Amendment? Another point of
divergence between the majority and the dissent was precisely what
28. Id. at 526 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 87-92 (2000)).
29. Id. at 526.
30. Id.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (1994).
32. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 528 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)).
33. Id. at 527.
34. Id. at 528.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 529.
37. Id.
38. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 528.
39. Id. at 535.
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"end" Congress intended to reach. Judge Dennis looked at the FMLA as
a whole and concluded that Congress's end was to prevent sex discrimina-
tion. In considering the FMLA one subsection at a time, the majority,
according to Judge Dennis, "fail[ed] to discover the true nature of the
creature as a whole."40 Finally, the dissent's most vigorous point was that
Congress is not required to compile a record of constitutional violations
before enacting legislation designed to combat race or gender
discrimination.41
Comparing the majority and the dissent's opinions, the majority's is
more consistent with Kimel and its predecessors. The majority made a
commonsensical response to the dissent. It questioned why, if rational-
basis is the only yardstick, would the Supreme Court go to the trouble of
formulating and adopting a congruence and proportionality test?42
Though the Fifth Circuit did not elaborate further, City of Boerne v. Flo-
res offers explanation.43 The Supreme Court conceded that Katzenbach
v. Morgan" suggested Congress may have the power to enact legislation
expanding the rights found in Section One of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.45 Yet, the Court resisted such an interpretation, calling it unneces-
sary and less than the best.46 It appears that Congress attempted to
expand Fourteenth Amendment guarantees by enacting subsection (D) at
least partially to deter pregnancy-based discrimination. As noted, the
Equal Protection Clause does not protect such discrimination.47 Con-
gress additionally expanded the Fourteenth's guarantees by offering, as
the Kazmier majority noted, substantially more protection against tempo-
rary disability discrimination than would likely be found unconstitutional
under rational-basis review.48 The congruence and proportionality test
urged by Boerne and adopted by Kimel ensures that Congress does not
expand the Fourteenth but rather legislates consistently within existing
guarantees. Thus, the test limits Congress in a way that the highly defer-
ential rational-basis standard cannot. Indeed, this was the Supreme
Court's intention in Boerne. It noted that Congress's power is not unlim-
ited, and if Congress could so alter the Fourteenth, the Constitution
would no longer be the law of the land. 49 Thus, Boerne and Kimel's ratio-
nale is important from a separation of powers standpoint; the Kazmier
majority's adoption of this test and its rationale is likewise important and
notably correct.
The majority is also correct in insisting that legislative findings of actual
discrimination are needed for a proper exercise of congressional enforce-
40. Id. at 544.
41. Id. at 534.
42. Id. at 530.
43. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
44. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
45. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-28.
46. Id.
47. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
48. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 528.
49. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528-29.
2001]
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ment power. The language of Kimel, admittedly, may suggest that legisla-
tive findings are not always a prerequisite. The Court stated that
examining the record is "[o]ne means" of determining whether a statute
is an appropriate remedy. 50 Yet, when considering the Supreme Court's
recent Eleventh Amendment decisions, actions speak louder than words.
These cases clarify that the Court relied almost exclusively on the re-
cord's insufficiency in determining that the statute in question was not an
appropriate remedy. For example, in Boerne, the Court determined that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was an inappropriate
remedy because Congress had revealed only anecdotal evidence, and not
a pattern, of religious discrimination. 51 Similarly, the Court in Fla. Pre-
paid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Say. Bank determined that
the Patent Remedy Act failed the congruence and proportionality test
because Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the
states, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations. 52 Finally, the Kimel
Court concluded that extending the ADEA to the states was an unwar-
ranted response to an inconsequential problem because Congress failed
to identify a pattern of age discrimination by the states-much less any
discrimination that rose to the level of a constitutional violation.53 Thus,
the Supreme Court requires a substantial record of discrimination for a
determination that Congress enacted a remedial statute consistent with
its enforcement powers. The dissent's suggestion to the contrary ignores
precedent and is unfounded.
The majority's bifurcation of subsections (C) and (D) may prove to be
yet another disputable issue surrounding Kazmier. As mentioned, the
majority relied on no case law in its separate consideration of the subsec-
tions. Presumably, a court could determine, as the dissent suggested, that
such bifurcation was an improper approach to statutory analysis. Argua-
bly, the majority did miss the forest for the trees, and a different ap-
proach to the FMLA could have yielded a different result.
Kazmier v. Widmann is an important precedent for Fifth Circuit parties
litigating claims under the FMLA or other federal statutes. Kazmier's
adoption of the Kimel principles, particularly the congruence and propor-
tionality test, serves as a guidepost for lower courts. Additionally, the
case is important procedurally. It clarifies that Fifth Circuit plaintiffs su-
ing a state under a remedial federal statute must initially offer congres-
sional findings of discrimination to avoid dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
The Kazmier decision is in accord with decisions from other circuit courts
of appeal, namely the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh. 54 No circuit
50. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000).
51. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531.
52. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
640 (1999).
53. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62.
54. See Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.
1999); Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2000); Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev.,
226 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2000); Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000).
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court of appeal has decided differently. It is important to note that
neither Kazmier nor the other decisions leaves employees without a rem-
edy. Employees can sue states and their agencies in state court under
state statutes similar to the FMLA. While Kazmier limits plaintiffs' fed-
eral court remedies, it serves the more important purpose of limiting con-
gressional power, preserving federalism, and maintaining a balance of
power among the branches of federal government.
460 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
